In 2009, Jeong et al. proposed a secure binding encryption scheme and an efficient secret broadcast scheme. This paper points out that the schemes have some errors and cannot operate correctly, contrary to their claims. In addition, this paper also proposes improvements of Jeong et al.'s scheme that can withstand the proposed attacks.
Introduction
An efficient secret broadcast problem is one of the basic problems in the broadcasting networks. In order to perform secret broadcast, a sender must broadcast a message secretly and consistently to the receivers. And also, a receiver must assure that all of the other receivers have also received the exact same message. However, it is not easy work to develop such a broadcast scheme [1] , [2] .
Quite recently, Jeong et al. [3] proposed a secure binding encryption scheme against chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model [4] . They also proposed an efficient secret broadcast scheme based on the binding encryption scheme. However, Jeong et al. schemes cannot perform correctly. This paper shows that there are two serious mistakes in Jeong et al.'s schemes as follows: (1) The encryption/decryption algorithms of their schemes do not perform correctly; (2) The schemes do not meet the requirement of message consistency unlike their claims. As a result, Jeong et al.'s schemes are impractical. To eliminate the security problems, this paper also proposes improvements of Jeong et al.'s scheme. Compared with Jeong et al.'s scheme, the proposed scheme can be used for the broadcasting networks because it is more secure and efficient.
Review of Jeong et al.'s Scheme
This section reviews Jeong et al.'s [3] binding encryption scheme and efficient secret broadcast scheme, respectively. (m) , and m = PE.dec sk (c), then the equation m = m always holds for any m. To make probabilistic public-key encryption scheme, the scheme uses the notation c = PE.enc pk,r (m) to explicitly denote that a random string r is used to make the ciphertext c. This means that a ciphertext c should be generated using an independently and randomly selected string r. Let F K : {0, 1} θ → {0, 1} θ be a function selected from a function family F, where F = {F K |K is in the space of θ-bit strings}.
Let BE = (BE.key, BE.enc, BE.dec) be a binding encryption scheme. BE.key generates a pair of public-/privatekeys for a party. BE.enc encrypts a plaintext using the public keys of a set of receivers. BE.dec decrypts a ciphertext using one of the secret keys of the receivers and outputs a plaintext if the ciphertext is valid or ⊥ otherwise.
• BE.key(1 θ ): A party P i runs this algorithm to generate a pair of public-/private-keys (pk i , sk i ).
1. The algorithm uses the key generation algorithm of a public-key encryption scheme.
2. The algorithm gets (pk i , sk i )←PE.key(1 θ ) and outputs (pk i , sk i ).
• BE.enc pk 1 ,...,pk n (m): This algorithm produces a ciphertext for a message m. 
This algorithm extracts a plaintext from the ciphertext (Γ, σ) using the private key sk i .
1. The algorithm first extracts the followings:
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the algorithm extracts and tests the followings:
3. If the test is not successful, the algorithm outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the algorithm extracts the followings:
and outputs m .
Efficient Secret Broadcast Scheme
Let BE = (BE.key, BE.enc, BE.dec) be a binding encryption scheme which is described in the above Sect. 2.1. 1. Assume that a sender wants to send a secret message m to the receivers (P 1 , . . . , P n ) in the broadcasting networks. We also assume that P i has a pair of public-/private-keys (pk i , sk i ) for the binding encryption scheme BE.
Sender → Each Receiver
a. The sender first makes the followings:
where Γ = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and σ = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n , b. The sender broadcasts (Γ, σ) to the receivers in the broadcasting networks.
Each receiver
P i extracts m ← BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) from the ciphertext (Γ, σ).
Cryptanalysis of Jeong et al.'s Scheme
This section proves that there are two mistakes in Jeong et al.'s scheme: (1) The encryption/decryption algorithms do not perform correctly; (2) The scheme does not meet the requirement of message consistency unlike their claims.
Incorrect Binding Encryption Scheme
Jeong et al.'s binding encryption scheme has a serious problem. That is, the encryption/decryption algorithms of their scheme cannot be correctly performed for secret broadcast.
In BE.enc pk 1 ,...,pk n (m) algorithm, the algorithm calculates c i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) as follows (see above Eq. (1)):
In BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm, the algorithm extracts k e by using the private key sk i as follows (see above Eq. (2)):
From the above Eqs. (1) and (2), we can easily see that the BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm cannot extract a correct k e by using the private key sk i . From Eq. (1), k e is encrypted by using the private key sk i and r i , where r i ← F k f (i) and k f ← {0, 1} θ is randomly selected value. From Eq. (2), BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm just uses its private key sk i to extract k e from c i . However, without knowing r i , it is impossible to obtain the correct k e form c i . So, the above Eq. (2) must be changed to correctly extract the k e from c i as follows:
However, r i is computed by BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm after extract k e as follows (see above Eq. (3)):
algorithm cannot compute Eq. (7) because r i cannot be computed in advance easily. As a result, although BE.enc pk 1 ,...,pk n (m) algorithm sends a valid ciphertext (Γ, σ), BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm will always output ⊥ because the ciphertext (Γ, σ) cannot pass the following verification equation (see above Eq. (4)):
Obviously, Jeong et al.'s binding encryption scheme is incorrectly designed. Since Jeong et al.'s efficient secret broadcast scheme as shown in Fig. 1 is basically operated by their binding encryption scheme, it automatically inherits the same design flaws as described above. 
to break the message consistency, where k * e ← {0, 1} θ and m * are a random value and a fake message chosen by A, respectively. A can intercept a ciphertext (Γ, σ), where Γ = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and σ = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n , d 1 , . . . , d n ) . It is easy to obtain the information since these values are readily available over the open network. Upon intercepting (Γ, σ), A replaces the intercepted c 0 with its computed c *
.
A then broadcasts (Γ, σ * ), where Γ = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and
In here, we assume that Jeong et al.'s binding encryption scheme is performed correctly without the design flaws as described above.
Upon receiving (Γ, σ * ), BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ * ) algorithm will extract m * * by decrypting c * 0 as follows (see above Eq. (5)):
From the above Eqs. (8) and (9), we can easily see that BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ * ) algorithm cannot obtain the original message m despite the satisfaction of the verification equation (4) for the decryption key k e because the algorithm does not check the integrity of the forged fake message m * . Moreover, for each receiver (P 1 , . . . , P n ), A can send different fake messages m * i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) to break the message consistency which receive different messages to all of the receivers. Obviously, Jeong et al.'s binding encryption scheme does not meet the requirement of message consistency. Jeong et al.'s efficient secret broadcast scheme automatically inherits the same problem as described above because it is basically operated by their binding encryption scheme.
Proposed Scheme
This section proposes an improvement of Jeong et al.'s [3] binding encryption scheme and efficient secret broadcast scheme, respectively.
Proposed Binding Encryption Scheme
In the proposed binding encryption scheme, the system setup environments are same as Jeong et al.'s schemes. The proposed binding encryption scheme performs as follows:
The algorithm uses the key generation algorithm
of a public-key encryption scheme.
• BE.enc pk 1 ,...,pk n (m): This algorithm produces a ciphertext for a message m.
1. The algorithm randomly selects k e ← {0, 1} θ .
2. The algorithm calculates the followings:
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the algorithm calculates the followings:
4. The algorithm outputs a ciphertext (Γ, σ), where Γ = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and σ = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n ).
• BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ): This algorithm extracts a plaintext from the ciphertext (Γ, σ) using the private key sk i .
2. The algorithm extracts the message m as follow:
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the algorithm extracts and tests the followings:
4. If the test is not successful, the algorithm outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the algorithm accepts the message m .
Proposed Efficient Secret Broadcast Scheme
Let BE = (BE.key, BE.enc, BE.dec) be a binding encryption scheme which is described in the above Sect. A. Figure 2 illustrates the proposed efficient 1-round secret broadcast scheme and runs as follows: Fig. 2 Proposed efficient secret broadcast scheme.
1. Assume that a sender wants to send a secret message m to the receivers (P 1 , . . . , P n ) in the broadcasting networks. We also assume that P i has a pair of public-/private-keys (pk i , sk i ) for the binding encryption scheme BE.
2. Sender → Each Receiver P i : (Γ, σ)
where Γ = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and σ = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n ).
b. The sender broadcasts (Γ, σ) to the receivers in the broadcasting networks.
3. Each receiver P i extracts and verifies m from the ciphertext (Γ, σ) by using BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) as follows:
Security and Efficiency Analysis

Security Analysis
This subsection will only discuss the enhanced security features of the proposed scheme. The other features are the same as original Jeong et al.'s scheme.
1.
The proposed encryption/decryption algorithms can be perform correctly. The random value r i is not used in the proposed binding encryption scheme unlike Jeong et al.'s scheme. The proposed binding encryption scheme uses only one random value k e to provide the message freshness. Since Eq. (10) in the proposed BE.enc pk 1 ,...,pk n (m) algorithm and (12) in the proposed BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm are always identical, the message m can be correctly verified by each receiver by using the verification equation (14). As a result, the proposed encryption/decryption algorithms can be perform correctly and secure. Since the proposed efficient secret broadcast scheme as shown in Fig. 2 is basically operated by the proposed binding encryption scheme, it automatically can be perform correctly and secure. θ and m * are a random value and a fake message chosen by A, respectively. Suppose that A replaces the intercepted c 0 with its computed c * 0 upon intercepting (Γ, σ) and then broadcasts (Γ, σ * ), where Γ = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and σ * = (c * 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n ). However, in the proposed BE.dec sk i (Γ, σ) algorithm, each receiver always verifies the integrity of the decrypted message m by performing the verification process c i ? = PE.enc pk i (k e , m ) (see above Eq. (14)). Therefore, the faked message m * is always rejected by each receiver (P 1 , . . . , P n ). Thus, the proposed schemes meet the requirement of message consistency. Table 1 shows the comparison results of the computational costs of the proposed scheme and of various multi-receiver encryption schemes [1] - [3] . As shown in Table 1 , we can see that the proposed scheme has the smallest computational workloads compare with Jeong et al.'s multi-receiver encryption scheme.
Efficiency Analysis
Conclusions
This paper pointed out two serious mistakes in Jeong et al.'s schemes: (1) An incorrect design of the secret broadcast scheme; (2) A message consistency problem. To eliminate the security problems of Jeong et al.'s schemes, this paper also proposed improvements of the scheme. As a result, compared with Jeong et al.'s scheme, the proposed scheme can be used for the broadcasting networks because it is more secure and efficient.
